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‘An Unlikely Trusting Relationship? The United States and Japan since 
1945’ 
Jan Ruzicka and Vincent Charles Keating 
Delivered at the 3rd Trust-building in nuclear world symposium, 
Birmingham University, September 4, 2012-09-021 
 
The U.S.-Japanese security relationship since 1945 has provided a fertile 
ground for the study of international politics. Constructivists have used 
it to demonstrate the validity of their claims that security is ultimately 
dependent on cultural norms and identity.2 Realists, on the other hand, 
maintain that the relationship is best understood in terms of alliance 
politics where one state (Japan) passes the costs of its own defence onto 
its ally (the United States). In the realist vocabulary, the relationship is a 
case of buck-passing.3 There are clearly good reasons for such diverse 
theoretical engagement with the case. For constructivists, it offers an 
example of a possible change in identity and the ensuing shift in foreign 
and security policy. In the period after the World War II, Japanese 
militarism gave way to a different identify of a civilian power, so the 
argument goes. It is an appealing prospect, because the change came in 
what could be considered an exceptional case of two states which fought 
an existential conflict. For realists, the case represents an anomaly that 
needs to be explained. Why would a powerful state like Japan spend 
significantly less on its defense and remain reliant on another state? Why 
would it behave in this way given that it found itself in confrontation with 
the Soviet Union, was in a close geographical proximity to the Korean 
War and remains within the range of North Korean missiles, and has 
seen the rise of the communist China. The only possible explanation for 
realists is to analyze the behaviour as buck-passing or free-riding, which 
consists of doing as little as is necessary for one’s own defense and 
shifting as much of the defensive burden as possible onto others.4  
                                                 
1 This paper is in draft form, and should not be used or cited without the consent of the 
authors: keating@sam.sdu.dk, jlr@aber.ac.uk  
2 Thomas U. Berger, ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-
militarism,’ International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1993, pp. 119-150; Peter J. 
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), see especially pp. TK; Sun-Ki Chai, 
‘Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques of Institutionalization,’ 
International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1997, pp. 389-412. 
3 Jennifer M. Lind, ‘Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese 
Security Policy,’ International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2004, pp. 92-121. 
4 Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, ‘Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting 
Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,’ International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2, 1990, pp. 
137-168. 
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Underlying both approaches are two crucial puzzles. First, why has 
Japan not developed its own nuclear deterrent? The refusal to do so is 
surprising because all the other potential competitors in the region 
possess nuclear weapons. Moreover, regional dynamics have long been 
seen as the key to nuclear proliferation. The second puzzle is more 
future-oriented. Will Japan begin to spend more on its defense and 
conduct a more independent and, as a result more robust, foreign and 
security policy? Once again, it is primarily the regional situation which 
gives rise to this puzzle. There are, of course, policy implications for the 
United States connected with this question, hence it is of obvious 
interest to American strategic planners and policy-makers.  
Answers to these two puzzles invariably differ depending on the 
theoretical approach. For constructivists, the absence of the nuclear 
deterrent is explained by the culture of anti-militarism, which has been 
shaped not only by the repudiation of previous cultural norms and 
identity, but also, crucially, by the experience of being the only country 
against which nuclear weapons have ever been used in actual combat. In 
terms of the second question, the relatively low defense spending will 
continue so long as these norms remain robust in the Japanese society. 
On the contrary, realists seek the answer to the first question in the 
presence of the American nuclear umbrella which has been spread over 
Japan formally since 1951 and informally even before then. Thus while 
they might even admit the existence of anti-militarist norms, particularly 
with regard to nuclear weapons, their emergence came as a result of the 
US security guarantee. As for the future defense spending, realists 
contend that it is already substantive, though Japan does not possess 
some offensive weapons systems. Moreover, defense spending could 
readily be increased if the US willingness or ability to provide protection 
were to decline or if additional or even more explicit threats arose in 
Japan’s immediate neighborhood. 
As is typically the case, both explanations have their strong and weak 
points. Constructivists will struggle with explaining a defense budget 
which, in terms of the GDP share, is low compared to similarly powerful 
states, but very substantial in absolute terms. In addition, they will have 
a hard time answering the question why it is permissible under the 
supposedly robust anti-militarist norms in general, and the anti-nuclear 
one in particular, to rely on another state’s nuclear deterrent. Realists, 
on the other hand, might be able to describe the Japanese behaviour as 
buck-passing, but that is hardly an explanation for the adoption of this 
policy. The question why a state in as volatile a region as North-East Asia 
would want to put itself into a position of such dependence remains 
unanswered. This leads some analysts to wonder whether Japan is 
neglecting its own security because it has been blinded by the strength of 
its ties to the United States. In the words of Peter Liberman, ‘overreliance 
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is possible because civilian powers’ antimilitarism could lead them to 
overestimate allied loyalty, to underestimate rising threats, and to 
balance inadequately until the danger levels already are too high.’5 
Depending on the United States and passing the buck might have made 
sense in the decades when Japan was recovering from the World War II, 
but not after it became a major economic powerhouse from the 1970s 
onwards.  
The partiality of each explanation has led two observers to call for 
analytical eclecticism when it comes to explaining the U.S.-Japanese 
security relationship.6 Although the case of analytical eclecticism is 
intuitively appealing, it faces a fundamental problem. Both approaches 
are underpinned by fundamentally different, and incompatible, 
understandings of how the two states relate to each other. To explain the 
dynamics of the relationship, constructivists only look inside one of the 
states, namely Japan. While this can tell us much about Japanese policy 
and attitudes, it seems unwarranted to think that examining one side 
can be a good guide to explaining and understanding a relationship. 
Normatively grounded relationships do not depend on one side only and 
cannot be a one-way street. For an approach that stresses the key role of 
social interaction, constructivist explanations of the U.S.-Japanese 
security relationship display a curious lack of intersubjectivity. 
Paradoxically, realists capture the relational dynamic of the security 
alliance better. Taking a socially impoverished view of actors as rational 
power-maximizers who want to protect their own interests gives them at 
least a framework that can capture both sides of the relationship. In 
their approach, the two states relate to each other in a series of strategic 
interactions the outcome of which is determined by the pay-off structure. 
The relationship will continue only so long as it is beneficial to both 
sides. 
The question of how the two states relate to each other, that is what kind 
of relationship is this, is therefore of crucial importance in analyzing the 
U.S.-Japanese security alliance. In particular, our article explores 
whether the relationship could serve as an example of a trusting 
relationship in international politics. Based on our novel 
conceptualization of trusting relationships, we argue that the absence  
of some and the removal of other forms of hedging strategies suggest the 
development of a trusting relationship between the two countries over an 
extended period of time. There is nothing inevitable or permanent about 
this trusting relationship. Such relationships may dissolve. What our 
                                                 
5 See Peter Liberman, ‘Ties That Blind: Will Germany and Japan Rely Too Much on the 
United States?,’ Security Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 134 [pp. 98-138]. 
6 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, ‘Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case 
for Analytical Eclecticism,’ International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2001-2002, pp. 153-
185. 
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approach allows us to do, however, is to spot the potential signs of 
deterioration. In this way, our article contributes to the study of trust at 
the international level, a research agenda which has been gaining 
prominence in International Relations over the last decade or so.7  
There are at least three good reasons why examine this relationship as 
trusting. First, it is a hard case for any theoretical approach which wants 
to argue that trusting relationships at the international level are possible. 
This is primarily so because at the beginning of the relationship there 
was open enmity and an existential military conflict. Second, there has 
been no shortage of tensions between the two countries in their economic 
relations. The Americans, in particular, have long accused Japan of 
unfair trade practices. Third, the case involves two states which could 
both adopt a wide range of hedging strategies. It is thus not an instance 
of a relationship where one side would be so weak as to have no other 
options but to rely on the other.    
In the rest of our presentation, we will do three things. First, we 
introduce our analytical framework. Second, we briefly apply this 
framework to the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Finally, we raise and refute 
some possible counter-arguments to our interpretation of the 
relationship.  
 
Trusting relationships in international politics: no need to hedge 
Any approach that allows for the possibility of trust playing a role at the 
international level must first answer the following question: How can 
trusting relationships be identified in international politics? Our 
approach begins with the simple assumption. Under pressure from the 
perpetual risk and uncertainty generated by the anarchic realm in which 
states find themselves, they will engage in hedging strategies. Hedging in 
this sense is a way of reducing one’s dependence on and vulnerability to 
others. Within anarchy, hedging strategies allow states to self-insure 
against possible defection or opportunism by other states, allowing one 
to act more securely in a risky environment because the possible ‘worse-
case’ outcomes are both anticipated and accounted for.8 A standard 
example of a hedge in a military alliance could be the decision by one 
state to keep more forces than are necessary should their partner fail to 
come to their aid when it is needed.9  
Trust functions in the same way as a hedge: it cognitively reduces or 
eliminates the residual risk and uncertainty. The two, however, are anti-
thetical. Hedging stresses self-reliance and hinders engaging in 
                                                 
7 Kydd, Hoffman, Rathbun, Larson, Booth and Wheeler, Wheeler 
8 Meyerson, Weick et al., 1996: 187. 
9 Lake, 1996: 15.   
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cooperative behaviour. By creating a sense of security, it may even lead 
to excessive risk-taking. Crucially, hedging shifts focus on what might go 
wrong and perpetuates worse-case scenario thinking. In sum, although 
hedging avoids the worst outcome and therein lowers the risk, it comes 
with a cost that lowers the expected value of the position and potentially 
promotes structural logics with negative consequences.   
On the contrary, the presence of a trusting relationship should reduce, 
or even eliminate, the need to hedge. Actors will simply behave in a 
manner suggesting that there is no risk of defection, or at least 
significantly less than might otherwise be expected. Put simply, we argue 
that should hedging exist in a relationship, it does not suggest a trusting 
relationship. On the other hand, trusting relationships should be marked 
by a large reduction or even elimination of hedging.  
Hedging cognitively lowers risk because it is assumed to diminish risk in 
reality, whereas trust cognitively reduces risk independent of a reduction 
of the ‘real’ risk. However, whereas hedging decreases risk through 
lowering the expected value of the outcome and potentially leads to 
problematic behavioural outcomes, trust lowers risk without a similar 
trade-off.  Fundamentally, this is the primary reason why trusting 
relationships, where possible, are to be valued.   
To come back to our original question of identifying a trusting 
relationship at the international level, the answer is now fairly 
straightforward. We can determine the existence of a trusting 
relationship by looking at changes in hedging behaviour across time. 
This allows the analyst to decide whether there is sufficient evidence in 
the long-term relationship to claim that it is trusting. It is only through 
examining long-term behaviour that we can differentiate between a 
trusting relationship and a potential short-term lack of hedging that 
might be used as a signalling device. However, in order to do so, an 
analyst needs to make two judgements on the situation.   
First, hedging, though material, cannot be understood outside of the 
social meaning of the hedge itself. The analysis must take into 
consideration the historical understandings of the action to comprehend 
the hedge –sacrificing an animal to the gods to increase the likelihood of 
victory in battle might be considered a hedge even if the analyst believes 
the hedge to be useless from their perspective. Second, taking into 
account the geographic and historical situatedness of the states in 
question, an analyst must make an assessment whether the state had an 
adequate hedge.   
Our approach presupposes that hedging will only occur if states are risk 
averse, a presupposition that we argue is likely, though not necessarily 
universal. The absence or presence of hedging must be assessed in the 
light of the state being able to hedge.  There cannot be insurmountable 
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material constraints to the prospective hedging action. In addition, there 
needs to be some consideration to whether the presence or absence of a 
hedge was caused by other factors, and whether the significance of these 
factors is great enough to influence the assessment.   
What are the benefits of our approach? First, it escapes the rational 
choice framework and does not conflate cooperation and trust. Second, 
because there is an emphasis on the material nature of the hedge, it is 
not entirely dependent on discursive statements that can suffer from 
strategic language. Third, it operationalizes the habitual nature of trust.  
Finally, it provides a framework through which the presence of a trusting 
relationship can be confirmed or refuted given the limits to epistemology 
in the social sciences. Importantly, using our approach means that it is 
possible to argue given empirical evidence, as the realists do, that 
trusting relationships do not exist, potentially demonstrating the 
irrelevance as much as relevance of trust in International Relations. 
 
U.S.-Japanese alliance as a trusting relationship 
How does our approach fare when applied to the U.S.-Japanese alliance 
relationship? There is evidence that hedging strategies, though available 
to both sides, have over time been removed or not adopted at all. This, 
we argue, is a better indicator of a developing trusting relationship in the 
security sphere then numerous instances of verbal expressions of trust. 
Similarly, because of frequent contestation in the economic sphere, the 
relationship cannot be characterized as trusting simply on the basis of 
the two countries’ ongoing cooperation.  
Following the post-World War II occupation, the United States 
incrementally relinquished an unprecedented degree of control over 
Japan. In doing so, it moved away from the view, frequently articulated 
in the early postwar years, that Japan could not be trusted as an ally 
unless there was a sizeable American contingent present in the 
country.10 While the United States clearly maintained sufficient safety 
net in the form of its own overall military capability to counter any 
potential U-turns in the Japanese foreign and security policy, it was 
gradually doing away with hedging strategies. Importantly, the U.S. 
withdrawals were typically accompanied by calls for greater Japanese 
military spending. In the absence of a trusting relationship between the 
two states such moves would hardly have made sense from the U.S. 
point of view. 
Although the declining hedge might have given rise to worries on both 
sides of the relationship (the Japanese might have questioned the 
firmness of the American commitment, whereas the Americans could 
                                                 
10 Schaller, 1997: 28-30. 
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have had concerns about Japan’s reliability as an ally), instead it enabled 
a virtuous circle of trust unlocking possibilities in the relationship which 
would have remained closed absent the presence of trust on both sides.11 
The corrosive effects of distrust were captured by one Japanese editorial 
in the early 1970s: ‘What we fear the most is the possibility of distrust in 
the United States giving rise to narrow-minded nationalism in Japan and 
its leading to the short-range reaction of favouring nuclear armament.’12 
In mirror reflection of the U.S. relinquishing its hedging strategies, there 
were a number of Japanese policies during the Cold War that 
disregarded or dismantled hedging in the security relationship. Faced 
with the Soviet, Chinese, and to a lesser degree North Korean threats, 
Japan resisted increasing its spending on conventional forces despite the 
U.S. prodding. Military spending as a ratio of the GDP remained three to 
four times below that of other comparable states.13 Japan also rejected 
the possibility of developing its own nuclear deterrent. In effect, it was 
showing trust in the alliance arrangement even with occasional U.S. 
suggestions that Japan might consider obtaining its own nuclear 
hedge.14 This was reaffirmed following the end of the Cold War when a 
secret Japanese government report concluded that as a result of 
acquiring nuclear weapons ‘the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella 
would be undermined and Japan would be viewed as distrustful of its 
military alliance with the United States.’15 There could not be a clearer 
recognition of the negative impact that a hedging strategy could have on 
a trusting relationship. 
Although the Japanese behaviour could be characterized as free-riding, 
and indeed had been derided as such especially in the U.S. Congress, we 
argue that the unwillingness to adopt hedging strategies is better 
understood as a manifestation of a developing trusting relationship. After 
all, assuming that states are risk-averse, there would be little point to 
free ride or pass the buck if one had reasonable expectations that things 
could turn out poorly through doing so. 
To conclude, the U.S.-Japanese relationship provides a good illustration 
of our argument about the development of a trusting relationship as a 
long-term historical process in which hedging strategies are continuously 
discarded and/or not adopted. While the negotiation and approval of the 
                                                 
11 Mollering on the wheel/circle of trust. 
12 Cited in John K. Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys, Will Japan Rearm? A Study 
in Attitudes (Washington, D.C.: AEI-Hoover Institution, 1973), p. 80. 
13 Chai, 1997: 390. 
14 Schaller, 2010: 173. 
15 Cited in Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, ‘Japan: Thinking the 
Unthinkable,’ in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss (eds.) The 
Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 227 [pp. 218-253]. 
 8 
 
1960 Security Treaty were met with large public protests (immediately 
after Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi forced the Treaty through the Diet 
in June 1960, he handed in his resignation), by 1970, when it came up 
for renewal, it enjoyed much greater public recognition. Eventually, it 
became a habitually accepted point of reference in the mutual 
relationship. What this suggests is that the existence of a trusting 
relationship is not a binary proposition. It is impossible to say that at one 
particular point the U.S.-Japanese relationship became trusting. What 
our approach allows us to do, however, is to focus on hedging strategies 
or the absence thereof as behavioural manifestations of trust over a 
longer period of time. 
 
